We investigated whether 20 emotional states, reported by 170 participants after participating in a Trust game, were experienced in a patterned way predicted by the Recalibrational Model. According to this dynamic model, new information about trust-based interaction outcomes triggers specific sets of emotions. Emotions, in turn, recalibrate the short-sighted or long-sighted programs in self and/or others that determine trust-based behavior propensity. Unlike Valence Models that predict reports of large sets of emotional states according to interdependent positive and negative affect alone, the Recalibrational Model predicts conflicted, mixed-affect emotional states. Consistent with the Recalibrational Model, we observed reports of mixed-affect (concurrent positive and negative) emotional states (e.g., strong simultaneous experience of triumph and guilt). We discuss the implications of having "conflicted minds" for both scientific and well-being pursuits.
Introduction
The central aim of this paper is to investigate whether 20 emotions, reported by 170 participants after completing a Trust game and learning of its outcome, were experienced in a patterned way that conforms to predictions of our proposed "Recalibrational Model" or predictions of Valence Models. The Recalibrational Model predicts the experience of emotions according to several dimensions (short-sighted, long-sighted, positive, negative, interpersonal, and intrapersonal) while Valence Models often predict the experience of emotions according to a positive-negative affect dimension alone.
The Recalibrational Model, shown in Figure 1 , describes a dynamic process in which the integration of new information (from trust-based decisions and interaction outcomes) triggers emotions. Emotions, in turn, recalibrate conflicting behavior regulation programs 1 , which we call the "short-sighted" program (V), and the "long-sighted" program (U). The relative power of these programs determines the extent to which an individual's behavior in a trust-based interaction trades off the short-sighted goal (opportunism) for the long-sighted goal (developing a trust-based exchange relationship).
The first part of the proposed model (1.1 in Figure 1 ) describes how the relative calibration of short-sighted and long-sighted programs ultimately determines Investor and
Trustee behavior propensity when individuals are confronted with a Trust game choice dilemma.
The second part of the model (1.2 in Figure 1 ) specifies how emotions, acting jointly in sets to recalibrate the operation of short-sighted and long-sighted programs in both self and others, are triggered by new information about Trust game outcomes. These sets of emotions computationally identify and respond to the presence of specific adaptive problems based on Trust game decisions and outcomes. A third part of this model (1.3 in Figure 1 ), untested with this research, specifies the kinds of targeted recalibration effects (i.e., "positive" upregulation and/or "negative" downregulation of short-sighted and long-sighted programs) that we expect emotions to encourage, resulting in changes to behaviors in self and others.
1 "Programs", from computational science, refers to neural circuits in the brain/body which process input information and accordingly cause outputs either in the form of regulatory feedback (reused as input by programs) or behavior. In support of our model, neural imaging studies provide confirmation of dual programs simultaneously activating in subject exposed to decision dilemmas (McClure et al. 2004; Hare et al. 2009 ). Internally conflicting programs with emotions as their co-evolved "guidance systems" may have been selected for because they can provide efficient solutions to the dynamic problems of changing environments (Tooby & Cosmides 1992; Livnat & Pippenger 2006) .
We used the various recalibration functions, proposed for the 20 emotions studied, to determine how specific emotional states fit into five unique sets of the Recalibrational Model.
Consistent with the premise of competing programs in humans' "conflicted minds", we observed participants frequently reporting mixed-valence emotional states (e.g., simultaneously experienced triumph and guilt). Mixed-valence emotional states are not predicted by simpler models still de riguer today, such as the bipolar affect Valence Model where positive emotions or negative emotions are experienced as interdependent negatively correlated opposites (e.g., see Lang et al. 1993; Ortony, Clore, & Collins 1988; Russell & Carroll 1999) .
Below, we report the results of factor analysis and structural equation modeling, providing evidence that the multivariate Recalibrational Model significantly outperforms the Valence Model when describing the patterned experience of emotions reported after a Trust game. These results support the theory that sets of recalibrational emotions are triggered in patterned response to the adaptive problems produced by trust-based interactions.
Trust-Based Decision Dilemmas and Behavior Regulation by Short-Sighted and LongSighted Programs
When one is confronted with a dilemma, there is an internal conflict over how to pursue alternative desired outcomes that cannot be simultaneously fulfilled at their maxima. We study such a dilemma modeled by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) , which we refer to as the Trust game. In the Trust game, an Investor first decides how much of a $10 endowment to send a paired Trustee, with the amount sent tripled, and then the Trustee decides how much of the tripled investment, or income, to return to the Investor.
The Trust game provides both short-sighted "opportunity" for gaining available resources and the possibility of developing a trust-based exchange relationship -a long-sighted security against the income risks associated with endowment asymmetry (such as resulting from the 50% chance of being Investor in this kind of experiment). 2 Short-sighted programs evolved to solve the adaptive problem of competition for limited resources with fleeting availability by encouraging capture of all resources present before they are depleted, foregone, or the possibility of seizing them becomes less certain or riskier. Reliable trust based exchange relationships are important securities that buffer against resource shortages and times of scarcity associated with risky income (e.g., from hunting, where 'lucky' individuals with food share with 'unlucky' individuals without food, with the expectation of reciprocity when roles are reversed). Indeed, laboratory studies have demonstrated that, in response to unsynchronized resource availability among individuals in a common environment, people act pre-disposed to engage in asynchronous trading relationships (Kaplan et al. 2012) .
We propose that these adaptive problems, modeled by the Trust game, are regulated by short-sighted and long-sighted programs (e.g., see Carrillo 1998; Kurzban 2010) in conflict with one another (Livnat & Pippenger 2006) . The relative calibrations of an individual's short-and long-sighted programs (determined by their unique histories, emotional capital, and present demands) regulate individuals' behavior propensity 3 in dilemmas such as the Trust game (see Figure 1 ). According to this dual program perspective, the Investor decision trades off his shortsighted "opportunistic" goal (achieved with earnings from a kept endowment and a maximally profitable investment) with his long-sighted "cooperative" goal (achieved by developing an exchange relationship in which both trust and trustworthiness are maximally demonstrated).
Likewise, the Trustee, having received a trust-based multiplied transfer of funds from the Investor, must decide whether to pursue her short-sighted program's goal (by keeping this income), or else pursue her long-sighted program's goal of developing a trust-based exchange relationship by returning an amount equal to or greater than what the Investor originally sent and thereby demonstrating her trustworthiness.
Recalibrational Functions of Emotions and Prediction of Emotional Experience
Based on a review of the emotion literature (see Schniter & Shields 2013) and our own considerations, we conjectured emotions to have functional features and propose a classification system that categorizes the twenty emotional states studied (see Table 1 ) according to constellations of their shared functional features. We chose to classify and predict twenty emotional states because they are frequently used in versions of the one-dimensional Positive 3 While we expect individual differences in degree (i.e., variance in relative strengths of regulatory programs or emotions), we do not expect differences in kind (i.e., direction of calibrational effects), since we take the existence of these programs to be species-typical adaptations.
and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) developed by Watson et al. (1988) Generally, an adaptationist and functional perspective of emotions (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides 1990; Buck 1999; Cosmides & Tooby 2000) argues that emotions facilitate behavioral regulation by recruiting the assistance of a number of psychological, physiological, and behavioral processes that provide either positive or negative feedback (pleasant and unpleasant experience) used in updating the calibration of conflicting internal regulatory variables. Pleasant experiences are rewarding and can incentivize approach behavior and continuation of the prior behavior or interaction that triggered them Carver & Scheier 1990 ).
Unpleasant experiences are costly and motivate a change, whether through behavior reduction, avoidance, or aggression (Gray 1971) . Of the set of twenty emotional states, we conjecture that nine [appreciative, happy, content, cheerful, triumphant, inspired, secure, proud, believable] are experienced as positive, one [surprise] could be either positive OR negative (forming the unique Set 3), and ten [disgusted, jealous, aggravated, frustrated, angry, depressed, sad, embarrassed, ashamed, guilty] are negative.
Emotions are ultimately designed to deal with adaptive problems requiring program orchestration (Tooby & Cosmides 1990 , Cosmides & Tooby, 2000 . The optimal calibration of programs managing an individual's behavior in a particular interaction depends in part on the calibration of other's behavior regulation programs. To solve this adaptive problem, emotions facilitate the achievement of program goals via intrapersonal and interpersonal behavior regulation (e.g., see Levenson 1999; Van Kleef et al. 2004; Butt, Choi, & Jaeger 2005 valuation of the long-sighted goal increases, affecting the ability to "commit" to its pursuit (Frank 1988 Another way that emotions are designed to function is interpersonally: by regulating others' programs in an effort to affect interaction behaviors with one's self. For example, consider the gratitude emotion. Discovery that another has foregone short-term rewards in the pursuit of a long-term exchange relationship with one's self, for example by providing resource or assistance, presents a fortunate relationship building opportunity for the recipient. Gratitude and appreciation can signal one's favorable valuation of the other and propensity to cooperate with them (Tooby & Cosmides 2008) , encouraging future trust much in the way that "promises" do (Schniter, Sheremeta, & Sznycer 2012) . Experimental evidence supports this functional account of grateful and appreciative feelings (Tesser, Gatewood, & Driver 1968; Algoe, Haidt, & Gable 2008; McCullough et al. 2001 ).
We conjecture that most of the emotions studied (thirteen of twenty), function both intrapersonally and interpersonally. By initiating self-imposed recalibrations with the functional equivalence of recalibrations that the offended party might otherwise impose, shame and embarrassment downregulate the other's non-cooperative inclination so as to preempt targeted inter-personal recalibrations of one's self. For example, shame could preempt another's anger or disgust reaction if it preemptively led to self-punishment and distancing one's self from the other.
Likewise, the appeasement function of embarrassment may act remedially; by effectively allowing rule violators to hedonically punish themselves, the angry and aggressive responses of offended parties are preempted (Keltner, Young, & Buswell 1997; de Jong 1999 Our recalibrational theory of emotions is built around conflicting short-sighted and longsighted behavior regulation programs, which determine an individual's choices when faced with decision dilemmas, such as in the Trust game. We propose that the emotions facilitating achievement of these programs' goals computationally assess game outcomes for the purpose of identifying and reacting to successes and failures of the short-sighted and long-sighted programs (in self and other). According to our model, emotions are "triggered" when they integrate information about the Trust game outcome and computationally identify specific successes and failures. We label these computational triggers L and S, for the long-sighted program's goal achievement and the short-sighted program's goal achievement, respectively.
We define the following variables observed in our Trust game: endowment (= e), amount sent by Investor (= s), amount returned by Trustee (= r). We calculated success (with a maximum of 1 and minimum of 0) of the short-sighted program achieving its goal (S) according to competing perspectives of the Investor (I) and Trustee (T): 
Design, Predictions and Procedures

Natural Experiment Design
We conducted a Trust game in which the Investor received an endowment of $10 and could send any portion of it to the Trustee, with the amount sent tripled. The Trustee then decided how much of the tripled investment, or income, to return (or else keep). Following the Trust game we administered a 20-item emotional status survey 4 in which participants reported how much they felt each of 20 emotional states (on a five point scale labeled (1) very slightly or not at all, (2) a little, (3) moderately, (4) quite a bit, (5) extremely) as a consequence of their recent game interactions and outcomes. The computer software presented all emotional states on one screen and in random order. Using this laboratory implementation of the Trust game, which engaged participants in one-shot anonymous economic interactions, and a well-established emotional status survey, we investigated whether emotional experiences were reported in a patterned and predicted way as a consequence of game outcomes.
Predictions
Inspired by functional theories of social emotions (Trivers 1981; Cosmides & Tooby 1989 ), Nesse (1990, p.275; 1999, p.458) 4 To avoid experimenter demand effects that might result by soliciting reports on only a few select emotional states commonly ascribed to failed trust-based interactions (i.e., anger and guilt) and identified in the literature (e.g., Ketelaar & Au 2003) , we constructed a survey of a large array of emotional states, based on the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS), a self-report measure of positive and negative affect states developed by Watson et al. (1988) that has been demonstrated across large non-clinical samples to be a reliable and valid measure of these states (Crawford & Henry 2004) . 
Experimental Procedures
The experiment, programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) , was conducted at Chapman University's Economic Science Institute. Participants were recruited from a campuswide subject pool consisting primarily of undergraduate students.
There were eight experimental sessions, each lasting approximately thirty-five minutes.
No participant participated more than once. Each session had between 18 and 24 participants, seated in individual cubicles, and was conducted as follows. An experimenter read the instructions aloud explaining experimental procedures and payoffs while every participant followed along with their own copy of the instructions. After finishing the instructions, participants were given five minutes to privately write down their answers to several quiz questions. After participants completed the quiz, the experimenter distributed a printed copy of the correct quiz answers. To ensure understanding, any remaining questions were answered privately.
Participants, randomly assigned to one of two roles: "person 1" (Investor) or "person 2"
(Trustee), interacted anonymously in the Trust game over a local computer network, then completed the 20 item survey in which they reported the intensity of various emotional states consequent on their decisions, game interactions, and resulting outcomes. Earnings from the Trust game plus $7 for arriving to the experiment on time and participating were paid out privately at the end of the experiment.
Results
In this section, we report general results of the Trust game and the emotional status survey. In section 3.1 we investigate whether 20 emotions were experienced in a patterned way that conforms to predictions of the Recalibrational Model or predictions of Valence Models. In 
Shared Features of Emotions
Valence Models assume two factors: one comprised of a standard set of positive emotional states that positively correlate with one another [appreciative, happy, content, cheerful, triumphant, inspired, secure, proud, believable, and surprised] observed 57 cases from 13 (7.64% of) respondents reporting positive and negative states that were both felt "extremely" (= 5); 231 cases from 34 (20% of) respondents reporting positive and negative states that were both felt in the range from "quite a bit" to "extremely" (≥ 4); 973 cases from 69 (40.59% of) respondents reporting positive and negative states that were both felt in the range from "moderately" to "extremely" (≥ 3); and 2653 cases from 114 (67.06%) respondents reporting positive and negative states that were both felt in the range from "a little" to "extremely" (≥ 2).
We used Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 7 to measure how well our data on reported These "standard" sets were based on the PANAS (e.g., Watson et al. 1988 We used CFA to evaluate the fit of nineteen emotions in their functional sets derived from the Recalibrational Model. In Table 2 we describe this derived fit as "Model R". Model R predicted the patterned experience of emotions according to the four factors corresponding to Set 1, Set 2, Set 4, and Set 5 of the Recalibrational Model (see Table 1 
Comparison of Structural Equation Model Fit
We used Structural Equation modeling to compare the fit of the Recalibrational Model to the fit of the Unrestricted Valence Model.
To compare these models we tested both with triggers S and L, as computed from game interactions. Results of both exercises are shown in Table 3 .
Given that we did not find support for either perfect independence or interdependence in section 3.1, we did not restrict correlations and allowed all latent factors to freely correlate in both models. 9 The Recalibrational Model has more factors than the Valence Model which could arguable lead to "overfitting" -having a better fit by describing more error instead of predicted 8 Results available upon request. 9 Comparative measures penalized for additional variables. Given that all between factor correlations were significant for the unrestricted Valence Model but not for the Recalibrational Model, this choice should bias against the Recalibrational Model's relative fit superiority.
relationship. To avoid overfitting, we report the BIC, which penalizes for added variables.
Finally, we report the difference between models, assessing whether the better fit was statistically significant despite the difference in factors seen in Table 3 .
As with CFA, we found superior results for the Recalibrational Model, consistent with P4. Despite penalizing for additional fitted variables, the difference was significant. In the Recalibration Model, all of the latent DV triggers' coefficients were significant (below 5%) with the predicted sign (see Table 4 ), whereas in the Unrestricted Valence Model not all (17 of 19) of the trigger's coefficients were significant (see Table 4 ). Finally, we found the overall equation level goodness of fit higher for the Recalibration Model.
Discussion
Using confirmatory factor analysis to assess latent sets, and structural equation models to assess triggers on latent sets we demonstrated that the Recalibrational Model predicts the experience of predicted emotional states (specifically, five latent sets of these) following the Model is interpretable because it is derived from principles of "recalibrational theory". Below we discuss potential sources of unexplained variance, consider future directions for further exploring the predicted effects of recalibrational emotions on trust-based interactions, and suggest some implications of having conflicted minds for both scientific and well-being pursuits.
We consider two potential classes of explanations for currently unexplained variation in how strongly emotional experiences are rated by participants: first, that participants either have imperfect access to their emotional states, differing interpretations of the emotion labels, or the fidelity of their reports is compromised, and second, that there is heterogeneity in the experience of certain emotions (e.g., guilt).
People who are asked to rate single emotions may not be able to accurately describe their emotional states (Ellsworth & Tong 2006) if emotion experiences are more often and accurately described with multiple words (Izard 1977) , or with different words among different people.
While we acknowledge that language could present problems for this research, the success of previous research on self-reported emotions in conjunction with experimental games (Ketelaar & Au 2003) gave us encouragement in pursuing measures of self-reported emotions following an economic game. Nevertheless, analysis of emotion reports revealed a "floor effect" that might have resulted from a problem with the instrument used, untruthful results, pathological inactivation of emotions in the studied context, a problem interpreting emotion labels, and difficulty identifying and reporting emotional states.
Nemanick and Munz (1994) suggested that the PANAS scale's lower anchor may not be properly constructed to form a true lower pole. The PANAS response option "1", the lowest response possible on the five point Likert, is labeled with a combination of two state levels: "not at all" and "very slightly". By combining both state levels into a single response option a larger proportion of response types from the possible spectrum (not at all to always) may accumulate at that value. Future research should consider restructuring the response options and testing whether a different distribution of responses results.
Data quality may also have been affected if participants made untruthful reports.
Experimental economists are particularly concerned that participants "will not 'tell the truth' unless incentives make truth telling compatible with maximizing utility" (Lopes 1994, p.218 ).
According to a meta-review by Camerer and Hogarth (1999) there is no clear evidence that additional financial incentives would improve the quality of responses in a simple survey task like ours. In fact, it has been noted that for short tasks like PANAS surveys that people are known to voluntarily complete without problem (because they have sufficient intrinsic motivation to do so), an attempt at increasing participation via financial incentives often "backfires" with counter-intentional effects (e.g., see Mellstrom & Johannesson 2008) .
Nevertheless, wary of the possibility that participants may have been incentivized to use efficiency tactics to expediently complete the survey (such as marking all responses with the same), we reviewed our data and found only one apparent case 10 of such behavior (< 1% of sample).
Frequency dependent selection can produce relatively stable mixed types in a population (e.g., see Lomborg 1996) , a phenomenon that might contribute to individual variation in emotional reports (Ketelaar 2004; Mealey 1995) . For example, sociopaths who comprise about 5% of the adult population (Mealey 1995) do not respond to remedial social gestures and likely lack emotions like guilt that facilitate the long-sighted program (e.g., see King-Cases et al. 2008 ). We are unable to account for individual variation in types that exist in our sample.
A battery of 20 emotional states (like in the PANAS) may be too broad for the purpose of studies like ours. Self-access to some of the emotional states studied may be limited and interpretation of labels may not be uniform. We chose this battery because it is comparable among widely used measures of multiple emotional states, however future studies on trust and emotions would benefit from a select set more appropriate to the problems studied. In selecting a refined set, universally interpretable and recognizable emotional states should be considered. We suggest appreciative, happy, proud, frustrated, angry, and guilty: a selected set with balanced valance that is representative of the functional categories covered by our model. Additionally, we observed that the emotional states represented in this selected set were individually predicted well (see Table 4 ) and demonstrated less of a floor effect than the other emotional states we studied (total 1s reported were 479/1020 or 47% versus 1266/2380 or 53.2%, respectively).
By triangulating with more objective neurological, physiological, and behavioral measures of emotional states some of the discussed limitations of itemized self-reports could be overcome. While untruthful reporting and reports by abnormal types in the population may occur and should be of consider by future research, we do not expect that these factors account for a large portion of observed variance.
While we have developed theory of emotions' ultimate function (i.e., what the mechanisms were selected to do) and derived our predictions of antecedents from it, this study only tests the emotions' proximate functioning (i.e., how and when the mechanisms are triggered). Future studies can take the Recalibrational Model one step further and test for ultimate functions by examining whether the future actions of those individuals who report emotions under the predicted conditions are affected as theory predicts. Three studies which we know of have taken this approach to testing ultimate functions already: Ketelaar and Au (2003) who demonstrated how the experience of guilt leads to choices of cooperation over opportunism, Fehr and Gachter (2002) who demonstrated that angry individuals are more likely to engage in costly punishment, and Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) who have shown that Investor happiness and gratitude increase trust in the Trust game.
The experience of mixed emotions has been discussed by others (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson 1999) and evoked with wins and losses in the laboratory (Larsen, McGraw, & Cacioppo 2001; Larsen et al. 2004) , as well as by trust-based interaction in our study. However, mixed emotions are not well appreciated as a core trait of human nature, and may appear as flaws of human nature that interfere with rationality (Sherer 1984; Elster 1995) . While some researchers have long moved past the bipolar affect models, instead recognizing that positive and negative affect are at times independent dimensions (e.g., see Watson, Clark, & Tellegen 1988) , psychophysiologists (Driscoll, Tranel, & Anderson 2009; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm 1993) neuroscientists ( In light of our model, we have identified the mechanics that could produce an emotional equilibrium between partners: a condition in which the emotional impact of partners' behavior on each other and on themselves is one in which all engaged programs are kept in the same relative state (before and after action). An important implication of this stable equilibrium is that even under such conditions, the mind is expected to remain conflicted. The recognition of a conflicted mind and the experience of mixed emotions challenges our intuitions of a "self's" singular internal interests and the consonance of a non-contradictory self-representation generally attributed to a sane mind. While the implications of a modular recalibrational theory of emotions might be existentially and even epistemologically difficult to grapple with, we extend the following practical implications for mental health professionals and laypeople alike.
Psychotherapists often treat patients who complain of and suffer from emotional statesand it is not uncommon for patients that patronize these professionals to seek an escape from unwelcomed emotions (e.g., Nesse 1991 Nesse , 2000 . Treatment of these emotions, whether through behavioral intervention or psycho-pharmaceutical treatment, may benefit from the degree to which psychologists, psychiatrists, and counselors are informed of (1) the functional uniqueness and similarities distinguishing the emotions and their taxonomic classifications, and (2) the choice dilemmas and post-decision situations from which emotional states precipitate. The
Recalibrational Model suggests that it is unrealistic and potentially harmful for wellbeing pursuits to aspire for a purely "positive" emotional state via complete transcendence or removal of "negative" emotional states. Life entails suffering and happiness because both positive and negative emotional states serve needed functions, recalibrating our own inner-workings as well as the inner-workings of those that we interact with. Given the uncertain future, we need to constantly engage in recalibration of ourselves and others to make the most of opportunities given our needs. 
